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I.
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 38 of the Agenda 21' adopted by the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro in June
1992 emphasizes the need for an enhanced and strengthened role of the
*
Ph.D., 1995 Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy; M.A.L.D., 1992, 1995 Fletcher
School of Law & Diplomacy; L.L.M., 1987, University of Nairobi.
1. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 151/26/Rev. 1 (vol. 1) (1993).
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United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the further
development of international environmental law. In particular, UNEP
should strengthen its role in the conventions and guidelines, the promotion
of its implementation, and the coordinating of functions arising from an
increasing number of international legal agreements. 2 Chapter 39 of the
same document recognizes and affirms the contribution of UNEP towards
the establishment of procedures and mechanisms to promote and review
the effective, full, and prompt implementation of international agreements
in the field of environment and development.' The establishment of the
procedures and mechanisms is to be done within the framework of the
overall objective to evaluate and to promote the efficacy of international
environmental law and "to promote the integration of environment and
4
development policies through effective international agreements. "
At its seventeenth session held in May 1993, the Governing
Council of UNEP adopted the Montevideo Programme II on the
Development and Periodic Review of Environmental Law. 5
The
programme is a continuation of the 1981 Montevideo Programme that was
adopted by the Governing Council in 1982 for the development and
periodic review of environmental law for the period 1981 to 1991.6 Both
programmes form the basis for UNEP's activities in the field of
environmental law in the 1980s and 1990s respectively. The Montevideo
Programme II identifies nineteen subject areas for consideration in the
development of environmental agreements in the 1990s.
The
implementation of the Montevideo Programme II will be reviewed by the
Governing Council no later than at its regular session in 1997.1
This article discusses three of the subject areas: dispute avoidance
and settlement, implementation of international legal instruments in the
field of the environment, and liability and compensation for environmental
damage. Reference is made to the provisions of both treaty and "soft law"
and how these provisions can be further developed within the UNEP
mandate to promote the efficacy of international environmental law.

2.

Id. para. 38.21.

3.

Id. para. 39.8.

4.

Id. para. 39.2.

5.

UNEP Governing Council Decision 17/25 (May 21, 1993), U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC

17/32 [hereinafter Montevideo Programme II].
6. See UNEP Governing Council Decision 10/21 (May 31, 1982).
7.

Montevideo Programme II, supra note 5.
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ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE AVOIDANCE AND SETTLEMENT

A. Introduction
Environmental protection is a value laden field in which conflicts
are ubiquitous and persistent. At both the national and international levels,
the implementation of environmental protection policies and obligations
more often leads to disputes arising from the encroachment upon perceived
property interests and national sovereign rights. The disputes seem to
multiply in number as public perception of environmental issues is
heightened by the increased dissemination of knowledge and information
regarding traditional issues such as air and water pollution as well as
emerging issues such as the ozone depletion, decertification, global climate
change, and loss of biological diversity.

At the national level, the

traditional right of the individual to enjoy his property is only limited by
the common law obligations not to cause injury to the neighbor's property
through negligence or creation of nuisance. At the international level, a
state's exercise of its sovereign rights is limited by the duty not to cause
injury or damage to the environment of its neighbor or "areas beyond the

limits of national jurisdiction. " The wide acceptance of this principle and
the resultant state practice in conformity therewith has the potential of
turning it into an opinio juris applicable to a wide range of environmental
issues concerning the protection of the global commons.
Given that the environment is a seamless web, environmental
disputes tend to be very technical and so complex that even states disagree
on what should or should not be provided for in a legally binding
instrument. Invariably, the end result is a compromise in general terms
agreeable to all states that are parties to the particular legal instrument.
Consensual resolution becomes elusive as and when disputes arise. State
priorities and imperatives take the center stage where political boundaries,
rather than the planet as a unit, are given priority. This reluctance to treat
the environment as an issue in which all the states have equal stakes
pervades the growing volume of positive international law concerning the
protection of the environment and the various sectors thereof.

B. Treaty Provisions
A survey of the provisions of international agreements in the
environmental field with respect to dispute settlement shows one common
trend: the provisions deal with disputes between the parties about the
8. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment: Report of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 and Corr. 1
(1972), reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
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interpretation or application of the agreements. For instance, Article 11 of
the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 9
provides that "in the event of a dispute between Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties concerned shall
seek solution by negotiation."'
"If negotiation fails, then the parties
options are: third party mediation, arbitration, submission to the
International Court of Justice, or conciliation, respectively."" In other
words, the parties must seek solution to their dispute by peaceful means.
A similar provision is found in Article 20 of the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal.' 2 "In the case of a dispute between Parties as to the
interpretation or application of, or compliance with this Convention or any
protocol thereto, they shall seek a settlement of the dispute through
negotiation or any other peaceful means of their own choice."' 3 If
negotiation fails, then by either agreement or declaration the parties may
submit their dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to the
Convention for arbitration under the provisions of Annex VI.4
Furthermore, the provisions of Article 27 of the 1992 United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity'1 are fairly identical to those of
the Vienna Convention of the Ozone Layer. The provisions of Article 14
6
of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change'
are also similar to those of the Vienna Convention of the Ozone Layer. In
essence, the provisions of treaties in the environmental field concerning
dispute settlement are restricted to the interpretation and application of the
specific legal instruments. Therefore, they deal with the rights and
obligations of states that are parties to the specific instruments, and with

9.

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, art. 11,

para. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 13, 26 I.L.M. 1529, 1533 [hereinafter Vienna Convention on the
Ozone Layer].
10. Id. para. 2, 26 I.L.M. at 1533.
11.

Id. para. 2, 26 I.L.M. at 1533.

12.

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes

and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, KAV 2634, S. Treaty Doc. No. 5, 102 Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel Convention].
13.

Id. 28 I.L.M. at 657.

14. Id. paras. 2, 3, 28 I.L.M. at 675, 685.
15. Rio Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, KAV 3747, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 20, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 822 [hereinafter Biological

Diversity Convention].
16. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, KAV 3339,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 38, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 848, 867
[hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
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the disputes that arise out of the enjoyment and discharge of these rights
and obligations.
The provisions do not deal with the resolution of
environmental disputes as much as those arising out of transboundary
environmental damage, the use of shared natural resources, the global
commons, or atmospheric interference as a result of state activities.

C. Soft Law
In contrast, provisions regarding the resolution of environmental
disputes have emerged in some documents embodying what is now known
as "soft law," the declarations and resolutions of intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations involved in issues of environmental
protection. Soft law provisions with respect to prior notice, environmental
impact assessment, and consultations are designed to prevent disputes from
arising in cases of transfrontier environmental injury. These provisions
help to provide the potential victim state with pertinent information of the
intended activities of its neighbor and provide a system for the amicable
resolution of any potential problems.
The Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to
Transfrontier Pollution adopted by the International Law Association at its
60th Conference in 1982'1 include these principles in Articles 7 and 8:
Article 7.
1.
States planning to carry out activities which might
entail a significant risk of transfrontier pollution shall give
early notices to states likely to be affected. In particular,
they shall on their own initiative or upon request of the
potentially affected states, communicate such pertinent
information as will permit the recipient to make an
assessment of the probable effects of the planned activities.
2.
In order to appraise whether a planned activity
implies a significant risk of transfrontier pollution, states
should make environmental assessments before carrying
out such activities.
Article 8.
1.
Upon request of a potentially affected state, the
state furnishing the information should enter into
consultations on transfrontier pollution problems connected
with the planned activities and pursue such consultations in
good faith over a reasonable period of time.
17. International Law Association Report Of The Sixtieth Conference Held At Montreal
(1982) [hereinafter International Law Association].
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2.
States are under an obligation to enter into
consultations whenever transfrontier pollution problems
arise in connection with the equitable utilization of a
shared natural resource as envisaged in Article 5.18
Section 2 of the international Law Commission's 4th Report on
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not
Prohibited by International Law 9 also addresses the need for notification of
potential loss or injury likely to be suffered by third party states as a result
of activities within the territory of the acting state. Section 2 provides,
[w]hen an activity taking place within its territory or
control gives or may give rise to loss or injury to persons
or things within the territory or control of another state,
the acting state has a duty to provide the affected state with
all relevant and available information, including a specific
indication of the kinds and degrees of loss or injury that it
considers to be foreseeable and the remedial measures it
proposes.20
This report has not been adopted, and so the provision still remains only a
proposal.
In its report, which is attached to Our Common Future2' and
entitled Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and
Sustainable Development, the World Commission on Environment and
Development Experts Group on Environmental Law proposed, inter alia,
that: (a) "[s]tates make or require prior environmental assessments of
proposed activities which may significantly affect the environment or use
of a natural resource"; 21 (b) "[s]tates shall inform in a timely manner all
persons likely to be significantly affected by a planned activity and grant
them equal access and due process in administrative and judicial
proceedings"; 23 (c) "[s]tates of origin shall provide timely and relevant
information to other concerned states regarding transboundary natural
18.

Id.

19. Robert Quentin Baxter, Fourth Report on International Liability for Injurious
Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, International Law
Commission, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC. 4/373 Annex (1983).
20. Id. at 86.
21.

FUTURE,

WORLD

Annex

COMMISSION

1 (1987)

DEVELOPMENT].

22. Id. princ. 5.
23. Id. princ. 6.

ON ENVIRONMENT

[hereinafter

WORLD

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

COMMISSION

ON

OUR

COMMON

ENVIRONMENT

AND
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resources or environmental interferences" ;24 (d) "[s]tates shall provide
prior and timely notification and relevant information to other concerned
states and shall make or require an environmental assessment of planned
activities which may have significant transboundary effects" ;21 and (e)
"[sitates of origin shall consult at an early stage and in good faith with
other concerned states regarding existing or potential transboundary
interferences with their use of a natural resource or the environment."2
Principle 26 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 7
merely provides that "states shall all resolve their environmental disputes
peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance with the Charter of the
" 28
United Nations.
The above provisions are proposals for the avoidance or
prevention of environmental disputes. As already noted, these provisions
have no legally binding force under international law. In order for the
provisions to acquire legal force, it will be necessary for states to conclude
bilateral, regional, or multilateral agreements providing for notification,
exchange of information, and consultation on potential environmental
effects of planned activities under their jurisdiction. These agreements are
likely to affect other states or areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and thereby give rise to environmental disputes.
D. Conflict Resolution
Where environmental conflicts or disputes have already arisen,
traditional norms, principles, and rules are only useful in cases where the
concerned states are neighboring, the cause of environmental damage
positively identifiable, the effect of the damage limited geographically, and
the damage is one that can be calculated and compensated in monetary
terms 9 In such cases, the judicial process is undoubtedly the most
appropriate means to settle disputes.
The performance of the International Court of Justice as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations in the field of environmental
conflicts has not been impressive to date. It remains to be seen whether
the court's stature is likely to be enhanced and its potential maximized with
24.

Id. princ. 15.

25. Id. princ. 16.
26.

WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 21, princ.

17.
27. Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf 151/26 (vol. I) (1992) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 880.
28.

Id. 31 I.L.M. at 880.

29.

See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1903 (1938 & 1941).
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the recent establishment of the Trust Fund to assist developing countries in
contentious cases10 and the creation of a special Environmental Chamber.3'
Because the court lacks compulsory jurisdiction, its effectiveness in the
resolution of environmental disputes may be hampered.
Before the
creation of the Chamber, some commentators had recommended the
strengthening of the International Court of Justice by broadening its
jurisdiction to give standing to nongovernmental organizations in
contentious cases and by the securing of advisory opinions.3
Other
commentators recommended the creation of an altogether separate
International Environmental Tribunal3 with compulsory jurisdiction similar
to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established under Part
XV and Annex VI of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea.34 Given the reluctance of many states to entrust the resolution of
their cases to the International Court of Justice even on an ad hoc basis, it
is doubtful they would be willing to bring their disputes before such a
tribunal or even to ratify any legal instrument accepting its compulsory
jurisdiction. Ultimately, as an international institution, the International
Court of Justice would exercise as much power or jurisdiction as the states
are willing to grant it. Other dispute settlement techniques such as good
offices, arbitration, negotiation, inquiry, mediation, and conciliation may
be used to settle disputes in the environmental area.
A distinct type of situation is presented by cases of apparently
normal day to day events and activities engaged in by many states that may
gradually result in conflicts or disputes due to their transboundary
interference with the use of global commons." Processes that generate the
chlorofluorocarbons that result in the depletion of the stratospheric ozone
layer or the uses of fossil fuel energy that produces greenhouse gases are
the cases on point. These are apparently common and beneficial activities
that are pursued by every state. Resolution of conflicts arising out of these
activities are not easily amenable to the traditional norms and rules of
30. See G.A. Res. 32, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No 89-64344, at 5, U.N. Doe.
A/44/PV. 43 (1989); Peter H.F. Bekker, International Legal Aid in Practice: The ICI Trust
Fund, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 659 (1993).
31.

See Chamberfor Environmental Matters, 23 ENVTL. POL'Y L. 243 (1993).

32. SIMONE
BILDERBEEK,
BIODIVERSrrY
AND
INTERNATIONAL
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 140-43 (1992).

LAW:

THE

33. See, e.g., Amedeo Postiglione, An International Court for the Environment?, 23
ENVTL. POL'Y L. 73 (1993).
34. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982), reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 1261.
35.
(1991).

OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 374-75
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dispute settlement.16 Who are the victims, and who are the perpetrators of
the environmental damage? Can the specific sources of the damage be
positively identified, and the liability therefore assigned to a particular
state or group of states? Can the damage suffered be calculated and
compensated in monetary terms? Even if the damage were calculable and
compensable in monetary terms some of the damage may be irreversible.
No amount of money could buy another ozone layer or a cooler climate in
the event of global warming.
Would environmental conflicts and disputes in such cases be the
subject of international and regional collaboration given the existence of
the common interest at stake: human survival? These are not "either/or"
cases. There does not exist a legally identifiable interest vested in one
state or group of states that would take action in the event of injury to the
environment. The resolution calls for the application of the emerging
principle in environmental management:
a new and equitable global
partnership." Environmental conflicts and disputes in such cases are the
concern of every state and must be addressed through the concerted or
joint efforts of all states. International environmental legal instruments
such as the Biological Diversity Convention, 8 Climate Change
Convention," and the declarations and resolutions of the United Nations
acknowledge that the depletion of biological diversity and global climate
change are issues that constitute a "common concern of humankind" to be
addressed by the entire global community notwithstanding the causes and
effects of these problems.40
Given that conflicts arise due to misunderstandings over certain
perceived interests, rights to be enjoyed, and the corresponding obligations
to be borne, the emerging principle of global partnership"' can be an
effective procedure for the resolution of environmental conflicts and
disputes particularly at the international or global level. States are fast in
realizing that the protection of the environment requires a rethinking of the
traditional concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity which treat
environmental issues as though they could be domesticated within their
political territories.

36.

Id.

37. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 27, at 876-80.
38.

Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 15, 31 I.L.M. at 828.

39.

Climate Change Convention, supra note 16, 31 I.L.M. at 848.

40. See, e.g., Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 15, 31 I.L.M. at 828; Climate
Change Convention, supra note 16, 31 I.L.M. at 851.
41.

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 27, at 876-80.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES

A. Introduction
Treaties evidence the express consent of the parties to regulate
their conduct in accordance with international law generally and the
specific provisions thereof. The majority of international legal relationships
between states are governed by treaties sometimes referred to as positive
international law. Treaties seem to transcend every aspect of state
relationships; their numbers are on the increase as more areas of state
collaboration and cooperation are developed. For example, in the field of
environment, the two decades subsequent to the 1972 Stockholm
Conference produced an unprecedented number of treaties dealing with the
environment in general and with specific aspects and sectors thereof.
The adoption of a treaty is only the beginning of an often long
process of state interaction.
The adoption of a treaty does not
automatically solve the problem addressed.
Unless the treaty is
self-executing, it has to be implemented by the states in order to discharge
the international obligations thereby assumed for the protection of the
environment.
The cardinal principle governing the creation and
performance of international legal obligations is pacta sunt servanda,
which is the rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be
performed in good faith.42 The principle derives from the consent of
states, and its importance is underlined by the fact that the Charter of the
United Nations, undoubtedly the principal law of nations, expressly
provides in Article 2(2) that members are to "fulfill in good faith the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter." 3 Article 26

of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties" provides that
"every treaty in force is binding on the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith." 4

The article codifies existing customary law

governing state relations, for there to be any significant legal regulation of
the international community, the principle is required. If every state can
rely on the other parties to a treaty to comply with the terms of that treaty,
then that state will also constantly seek to comply with its treaty
obligations.
However, pacta sunt servanda is not a practically reliable principle
for implementation of certain treaty obligations. In the absence of an

42.

LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 493-505 (1961).

43.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2,

2.

44. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, KAV 2424, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
45.

Id. 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339, 8 I.L.M. at 690.
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international enforcement agency, parties to a treaty will only take
implementation measures when it is in their own interests to do so. States
are represented by elected officials who answer to their local constituents
rather than the international community. Therefore, the local interests and.
imperatives take priority. Treaties have to provide for an implementation
mechanism particularly in the field of environmental protection where
inaction on the part of signatories to the convention may have injurious
consequences.
Implementation mechanisms entail monitoring and
reporting procedures that may be adopted by states. Monitoring represents
the continuous observation, measurement, and gathering of information on
the condition of a given ecosystem or environmental sector and its
response to man-made interference.
As a supervision technique,
monitoring is of vital importance for the implementation of international
environmental rules. "It is important for the establishment and operation
of both national and international management schemes in general and for
the supply of adequate information on environmental risks of planned
measures as well as the prevention and abatement of accidental
environmental injury in particular. "' A few examples of these procedures
are discussed below.
B. Treaty Provisions on Monitoring and Reporting Procedures
An analysis of treaty provisions on monitoring and reporting
procedures reveals a fundamental issue that international lawyers have
grappled with for a long time.
The issue with regard to the
implementation of positive international law in general, as well as positive
international environmental law, is who has the authority to define the
obligation, to determine if it has been breached, and to demand the
accomplishment of what they believe to be the legal result of that
determination. 7 Many environmental treaties do not adequately address
the issue of authority. States are reluctant to create an international
government that would usurp powers incidental to their sovereignty. As a
consequence, the implementation of treaties lack sufficient efficacy. States
do not define rules of positive law or allocate authority to determine
whether the treaty has been breached by nonimplementation or what legal
results should flow from such breach.41 The result is that the treaty
46. Kamen Sachariew, Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Legal
Standards:Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms, 2 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 31,
34 (1992).
47.
(1993).

Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing the Rules of InternationalLaw, 34 HARV, INT'L L.J. 149

48. Id.
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provisions notwithstanding the international legal order is unable to
discipline a state that refuses to enforce its environmental obligations owed
to other states.
A common method adopted by state parties for the implementation
of provisions of environmental treaties is a system of exchange of
information relevant to the environmental problem addressed by the treaty
in question. Such a system has the main advantage of advancing general
and technical knowledge on various aspects of environmental protection
such as combating or reducing environmental pollution.
As an
implementation mechanism, however, such a system is a weak check on
compliance with the provisions of an environmental law treaty unless the
system is supported by an elaborate protocol or series of protocols
providing for detailed follow-up rules and regulations.
An example of a treaty with elaborate protocols is the 1979
European Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution.4 9 The
protocols are designed to meet the threat of acid rain which is a
widespread and destructive form of pollution in Europe. The Convention
itself mandates no precise reduction in the emissions of the injurious sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide. The Convention does provide for research
and development, ° exchange of information and consultation," and a
general commitment to limit and gradually reduce air pollution as far as
possible. 2
Parties must provide data on emissions and on control
technologies for reduction of air pollution. 3 The first protocol, the 1984
Geneva Protocol for Long-Term Financing of Monitoring, deals with
financing under the pre-existing Cooperative Programme for Monitoring
and Evaluation of the Long Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in
Europe (EMEP).' The 1985 Helsinki Protocol on the Reduction of Sulfur
Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent
committed the parties to make a thirty percent across-the-board cut in
49. Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 34 U.S.T.
3043, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Transboundary Air Pollution].
50. Id. art. 7, 34, U.S.T. 3047, 18 I.L.M. at 1444-45.
51. Id. art. 8, 34 U.S.T. 3047-48, 18 I.L.M. at 1445.
52. Id. art. 9, 34 U.S.T. 3048-49, 18 I.L.M. at 1446.
53. Id., 34 U.S.T. 3048-49, 18 I.L.M. at 1446.
54. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, on
Financing the Monitoring and Evaluation of Air Pollutants in Europe, Sept. 28, 1984, reprinted
in 24 I.L.M. 484 (entered into force Jan. 28, 1988).
55. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the
Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Percent, July 8,
1985, U.N. Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/II and ECE/EB.AIR/12, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 699 (entered
into force Sept. 2, 1987).
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sulfur dioxide emissions from 1980 levels.16 The 1988 Sofia Protocol on
the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary
Fluxes" committed the parties to control and reduce their annual emissions
of nitrogen oxide to their 1987 levels."6 The 1991 Geneva Protocol on the
Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or their
Transboundary Fluxes"9 committed the parties to control or reduce their
national annual emissions by thirty percent by the year 1999 using the
1988 levels as a basis or any other annual level during the 1984 to 1990
period which the parties may specify upon signature of or accession to the
protocol.60 Implementation of the Convention and the Protocols is ensured
through elaborate provisions for, inter alia, commercial exchange of
technology' "direct industrial contacts and cooperation, including joint
ventures," 62 research and monitoring,' 3 and "exchange of information and
experience. "64
Some environmental treaties require that the parties report the
implementation of the treaty provisions.
However, the reporting
mechanism is left to the discretion of each state. These are self-monitoring
and self-reporting provisions that do not provide for intervention or
verification by other states parties or an independent institution.- Indeed,
verification of noncompliance or nonimplementation constitutes a crucial
element in international legal instruments particularly those dealing with
environmental protection. Environmental protection is an area in which
the rapid development of science and technology as well as the growth of
awareness of environmental issues make it imperative that the efficacy of
56.

Id. art. 2, 27 I.L.M. at 699.

57. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct.
31, 1988, reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 212.
58.

Id. art. 2, 28 I.L.M. at 216..

59.

Protocol to the

1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution

Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary
Fluxes, U.N. Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/30 (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 568.
60.

Id. art. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 575.

61.

Id. art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 578.

62.

Id. art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 578.

63. Id. art. 5, 31 I.L.M. at 578.
64. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary
Fluxes, Economic Commission for Europe, art. 4, at 6, U.N. Doc. ECE/EB.AIR/30 (1991),
reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 568.

65. See, e.g., Joseph Mbuna, Strengthening UNEP to Improve Environmental Treaty
Compliance, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY MAKING 163, 167-68 (Lawrence E.
Susskind et al. eds., 1992).
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treaty provisions be verified, reviewed, and constantly updated to keep
abreast with the scientific developments.
The 1985 Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer66 and the 1987
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol on the Ozone Layer) 7 established a regime for monitoring,
assessing, validating, and cooperation among the states' parties. The
Protocol imposed limits on ozone depleting chemicals, including a fifty
However, the main
percent cut in chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).6
shortcoming with these two legal instruments was that they left the process
of implementation to each party. Each party was to voluntarily implement
the control measures established for the consumption of the controlled
substances.6 Each party was to determine its own control levels with
respect to import, export, and consumption of the controlled substances.
Additionally, the parties were to provide to the Secretariat "data on its
production, imports and exports of each of the controlled substances for
the year 1986, or the best possible estimates of such data where actual data

are not available.

"70

The 1990 London Amendments 7' and the 1992 Copenhagen
Adjustments 2 to the Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer have
considerably strengthened the reporting and implementation procedures.
In June 1990, the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
adopted procedures for determining noncompliance with the provisions of
the Protocol and the institutional mechanism for the treatment of parties
found to be in noncompliance.
According to the decision, an
Implementation Committee was to be established to receive, consider, and
report on any submission made by parties who have reservations regarding
another party's implementation of its obligations under the Protocol. In
other words, the parties were allowed to mutually police each other under
this procedure without being accused of interference in the domestic affairs
66. Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer, supra note 9, T.I.A.S. No. 11,097 at 4, 26
I.L.M. at 1529.
67. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
68. Id. art. 2, 26 I.L.M. at 1552-64.
69. Id. art. 3, 26 I.L.M. at 1554.
70. Id. art. 7, 26 I.L.M. at 1556.
71. See London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer with Annexes, Jun. 29, 1990, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 537 [hereinafter London Amendment].
72. See Montreal Protocol Parties: Adjustments and Amendments to the Montreal Protocol
Deplete Ozone
Layer,
Jun.
29,
1990,
UNEP Doc.
on Substances that
UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/L.5/Rev. 1.
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of another state.
Thus, recognizing that the responsibility for the
protection of the ozone layer is not borne by each party to the Protocol
individually and separately. However, "the Committee has no powers of
investigation or enforcement."" Besides, "its members are not objective
experts, but state representatives who may politicize the Committee's
mission. "" Furthermore, "information submitted to the Committee is to be
kept confidential, weakening the incentives for the Committee to
aggressively pursue violations."" The Basel Conventionf 6 provides for a
verification procedure:
[A]ny Party which has reason to believe that another Party
is acting or has acted in breach of its obligations under this
Convention may inform the Secretariat thereof, and in
such an event, shall simultaneously and immediately
inform, directly or through the Secretariat, the Party
against whom the allegations are made.
All relevant
information should be submitted by the Secretariat to the
Parties."
However, the fact that the Article uses discretionary rather than
mandatory language is most likely the reason that the Basel Conference did
not want to impose a verification obligation on the parties to the
Convention. The result is a weak procedure that falls short of establishing
an efficient reporting and implementation mechanism. In addition, the
Secretariat lacks the power to enforce or demand implementation of the
provisions of the Convention. 71 In fact, the ultimate authority rests with
the parties to the Convention. The Secretariat's duties are purely
administrative and clerical. 9 Furthermore, the Conference of the Parties
does not have the authority to enforce compliance with the Convention and
institute remedial action in cases where a state has acted in breach of the
Convention. s
One of the objectives of the Montevideo Programme II, adopted by
the Governing Council of UNEP, is promoting the implementation of the
73. Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the
Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 543 (1991).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Basel Convention, supra note 12, 28 I.L.M. at 649.
77.

Id. art. 19, 28 I.L.M. at 674.

78.

Id. art. 16, 28 I.L.M. at 671-72.

79. Id. art. 16, 28 I.L.M. at 671-72.

80. Id. art. 15, 28 1.L.M. at 670-71.
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Basel Convention."t It is hoped that this important issue will be discussed
at subsequent meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention.
This issue was not discussed at the first meeting held in Piriapolis,
Uruguay in December 1992,2 nor was it discussed at the second one held
in Geneva in March, 1994.3
Admittedly, exposure is one method of ensuring implementation of
positive international law provisions by the recalcitrant parties.
Theoretically, many states do not like to be the subject of discussion in
international fora, where political and social pressure is brought to bear
upon them for reneging on the international obligations that they assumed
by consent. However, there is very little, if any, exposure under the Basel
Convention as there is no follow-up mechanism once noncompliance or a
breach of the Convention has been reported to the Secretariat. No organ
of the Secretariat is established to investigate an alleged breach, and there
is no provision for discussion of such a breach by the Conference of the
Parties.
The Biological Diversity Convention is aimed at the conservation
of the earth's biological diversity, promotion of the sustainable use of its
components, and the equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the
utilization of genetic resources." The Convention gives juridical character
to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,8
hitherto regarded as a nonlegally binding declaration of political consensus
only.86 The principle recognizes that nations have the right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and declares
that nation also have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
states or areas beyond the limits of their national jurisdiction. The
Convention then places a duty on the parties to conserve biological
diversity within and, in certain cases, beyond the limits of their national
jurisdiction.' Restating the sovereign rights of states over their natural
resources including genetic resources, the Convention provides that the
authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with the national
8 Such
governments, and it is subject to national legislation.1
access must
81.

Montevideo Programme II, supra note 5.

82. See 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. 807 (BNA) (1992).
83. See 17 Int'l Envtl. Rep. 297 (BNA) (1994).
84. Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 15, art. 1, 31 I.L.M. at 828.
85. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 8.
86. Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 15, art. 3, 31 I.L.M. at 828.
87. Id. art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 824.
88. Id. art. 15, 31 I.L.M. at 828.
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be on mutually agreed terms and subject to the provisions of the
Convention. 9
Regarding general measures for conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity, each party must, "in accordance with its particular
conditions and capabilities . . . [d]evelop national strategies, plans or

programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity" and to "[i]ntegrate, as far as possible and as appropriate, such
conservation" and use relevant sectoral or cross-sectoral plans,
programmes, and policies."" ° It is also noteworthy that the obligations
stated in the Convention are to be discharged, and the provisions of the
Convention are to be implemented by "each Contracting Party

. .

. as far

as possible and as appropriate. " 9 There is no standard criterion for the
determination of what is possible and what is appropriate. Since this
determination is left to the parties, there is bound to be wide divergence in
the criteria to be adopted by each party and its appropriateness.
Accordingly, implementing the provisions of the Convention, and the
reporting mechanisms used, are bound to be disparate, as these will be
dependent on the individual state's priorities and imperatives as well as its
technological development.
The Convention establishes two institutions: The Conference of the
Parties 2 and the Secretariat. 93 The Conference of the Parties is designed to
keep implementation of the Convention under review by, inter alia,
establishing the form and the intervals for transmitting information which
is furnished by the parties to the Convention regarding the measures they
have taken, and the effectiveness of those measures.94 The Conference is
to consider this information as well as reports submitted by any subsidiary
body. 9 When considering this information, it is not clear whether the
Conference can make specific suggestions and recommendations to the
parties for better implementation of the Convention. The parties are given
great leeway in designing the implementation policies and actions "as far

89.
90.
91.
825-28.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. art. 15, 31 I.L.M. at 828.
Id. art. 6, 31 I.L.M. at 825.
Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 15, arts. 5, 6(b), 7-11, 14, 31 I.L.M. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.

23, 31 I.L.M. at 832-33.
24, 31 I.L.M. at 833.
23, 31 I.L.M. at 833.
23(4)(a), 31 I.L.M. at 832.
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as possible and appropriate. "9 The, Secretariat has no monitoring or
reporting powers as his or her duties are only administrative.9
The Climate Change Convention contains very general and vague
commitments by the parties regarding the stabilization of greenhouse gas
emissions. 9 These commitments are to be discharged by all parties,
"taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and
their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and
circumstances. "9 The Convention does not identify these common but
differentiated responsibilities nor does it address the extent to which the
There is no commitment on
parties are bound to discharge them.
reduction of greenhouse gases. The Convention does establish a process
which is designed to improve the public information base, reduce
uncertainties, encourage national planning, and produce more substantive
international standards should scientific evidence continue to show that
human activities are changing the earth's climate. 'a0
Article 7 of the Convention establishes the Conference of the
Parties as the supreme body of the Convention with the mandate to keep
implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that
Promoting effective
may be adopted under regular review.'01
implementation of the Convention is to be carried out in the prescribed
ways.1w The Secretariat is assigned administrative and secretarial functions
for the purpose of serving the Conference of the Parties.' 3 A subsidiary
body, under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties, is established to
assist the Conference of the Parties in its assessment and review of the
effective implementation of the Convention.' °0 This body is to be "open to
0 The body is to be comprised of government
participation by all parties." '
representatives who are experts on matters related to climate change, and
"shall report regularly to the Conference of the parties on all aspects of its
work."',- Article 12 of the Convention provides for communication of
information related to implementation of the Convention by each party.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Biological Diversity Convention, supra note 15, arts. 23, 24.
Id.
Climate Change Convention, supra note 16, 31 I.L.M. at 848.
Id. art. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 855-59.
Id. arts. 4-6, 31 I.L.M. at 855-60.
Id. art. 7, 31 I.L.M. at 860-62.
Id. art. 7 para. 2, 31 I.L.M. at 860.
Climate Change Convention, supra note 16, art. 8, 31 I.L.M. at 862-63.
Id. art. 10, 31 I.L.M. at 863-64.
Id. art. 10 para. 1, 31 I.L.M. at 863-64.
Id. art. 10 para. 1, 31 I.L.M. at 863-64.
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One of the elements to be included in the information is a general
description of steps taken or envisaged by the parties to implement the
Convention.' 7 Both this Article and the cross referenced Article 4(1) do
not say how often this information is to be communicated by the states
parties to the Convention. It may be deduced, however, that since the
Conference of the Parties to which the communication is to be directed is
to hold its ordinary sessions annually,'10 the communication is to be made
annually. It should be noted that the mandate of the Conference of the
Parties is limited to the consideration and adoption of regular reports on
the implementation of the Convention, and to making recommendations on
any matters necessary for the implementation of the Convention.1,9 The
Conference has no powers to make legally binding decisions in respect to
implementation of the Convention.
C. Suggested Ways of Enhancement
The signature and ratification of international environmental
treaties does not per se change the conduct of states and other parties
thereto. Like most international legal instruments, the treaties have to be
implemented at the municipal level where states are required to take
legislative and/or administrative steps to bring the provisions of the treaties
into force. Without such steps, the signature and ratification of treaties
would end up becoming processes of international window dressing for
some states. And, thereafter, the treaties would end up on the ministerial
shelves to gather dust. If treaties and other instruments for environmental
protection are to be efficiently implemented, they must contain elaborate
provisions for follow-up mechanisms which monitor and verify state
parties' actions at the municipal level. Except for the precedent setting
London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer,"10 most
legal instruments on environmental protection are, at best, half-hearted
attempts at verification and monitoring of state activities through their
provisions for implementation. Future Conventions and protocols need to
adequately address the problem of implementation. The developments in
other fields could provide a guidance.
The constitutional provisions relating to the implementation of
Conventions and Recommendations, adopted by the International Labour
Conference,
provide an excellent and successful example of

107.

Id. art. 12 para. 1(b), 31 I.L.M. at 865.

108.

Climate Change Convention, supra note 16, art. 7 para. 4, 31 I.L.M. at 862.

109.

Id. art. 7 para. 2(f), (g), 31 I.L.M. at 861.

110.

London Amendment, supra note 71.
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implementation provisions which ensure that legal instruments are adopted
by signatory states."' The relevant provisions of the International Labour
Organization Constitution are quoted as an illustration:
Article 19:
5. In the case of a Convention (a) the Convention shall be communicated to all Members
for ratification;
(b) each of the Members undertakes that it will, within the
period of one year at most from the closing of the
session of the Conference, or if it is impossible owing
to exceptional circumstances to do so within the period
of one year, then at the earliest practicable moment
and in no case later than 18 months from the closing of
the session of the Conference, bring the Convention
before the authority or authorities within whose
competence the matter lies, for the enactment of
legislation or other action;
(c) Members shall inform the Director-General of the
International Office of the measures taken in
accordance with this article to bring the Convention
before the said competent authority or authorities
regarded as competent, and of the action taken by
them;
(d) if the Member obtains the consent of the authority or
authorities within whose competence the matter lies, it
will communicate the formal ratification of the
Convention to the Director-General and will take such
action as may be necessary to make effective the
provisions of such Convention;
(e) if the Member does not obtain the consent of the
authority or authorities within whose competence the
matter lies, no further obligation shall rest upon the
member except that it shall report to the
Director-General of the International Labour Office..
. the position of its law and practice in regard to the
matters dealt with in the Convention, showing the
extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed
to be given, to any of the provisions by legislation,
111. See The International Labour Organization Constitution, U.K.T.S 47 (1948), Cmnd.
7452; see also Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War, 31 AM. J. INT'L L.
Supp. 67 (1937).
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administrative action . . . or otherwise and stating the
difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of
such Convention.
6.
In the case of a Recommendation (a) the Recommendation will be communicated to all
Members for their consideration with a view to effect
being given to it by national legislation or otherwise;
(b) each of the Members undertakes that it will, within a
period of one year at most from the closing of the
session of the Conference, or if it is impossible owing
to exceptional circumstances to do so within the period
of one year, then at the earliest practical moment and
in no case later than 18 months after the closing of the
Conference, bring the Recommendation before the
authority or authorities within whose competence the
matter lies for the enactment of legislation or other
action;
(c) the Members shall inform the Director General . . . of
the measures taken in accordance with this article to
bring the Recommendation before the said competent
authority or authorities with particulars of the authority
or authorities regarded as competent, and of the action
taken by them;
(d) apart from bringing the Recommendation before the
said competent authority or authorities, no further.
obligation shall rest upon the Members, except that
they shall report to the Director-General . . . the
position of the law and practice in their country in
regard to the
matters dealt with in the
Recommendation, showing the extent to which effect
has been given, or. is proposed to be given, to the
provisions of the Recommendations and such
modifications of these provisions as it has been found
or may be found necessary to make in adopting or
applying them.
Article 22:
Each of the Members agree to make an annual report to
the International Labour Office on the measures which it
has taken to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to
which it is a party. These reports shall be made in such
form and shall contain such particulars as the Governing
Body may request.
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Article 23:
(1) The Director-General shall lay before the next meeting
of the Conference a summary of the information and
report communicated to him by Members in pursuance
of articles 19 and 22.
(2) Each Member shall communicate to the representative
organizations recognized for the purpose of article 3
(i.e. employers' and workers' organizations) copies of
the information and reports communicated to the
Director-General in pursuance of articles 19 and 22.112
The field of human rights law provides another example where the
implementation of legal instruments has been successful, to some extent,
with some innovative procedures which could be adopted for the
implementation of environmental treaties. The protection of human rights,
just like the protection of the environment, is a matter of international law
which cannot be limited to the domestic jurisdictions of states.
International human rights law, like international environmental law,
operates beyond the municipal legal system which makes remedy and
redress of breaches ineffective. Under the relevant provisions of the
United Nations Charter, "3 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights," 4 the Optional Protocol,"' several resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly, and the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, several bodies and procedures have been established for
purposes of monitoring and reporting on the effective and efficient
implementation of international legal instruments for the protection of
human rights. In addition to expert bodies under the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations, the Commission on the Status of Women,
and the Commission on Human Rights are two functional commissions.
The Commission on Human Rights is the United Nations most important
human rights forum, it has a Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, several working groups,
special rapporteurs, representatives, and experts. The Sub-Commission,
along with working groups and rapporteurs, have powers to visit member
states of the United Nations for fact finding and verification purposes of
the status of human rights practices in the states. Their findings and

112.

The International Labour Organization Constitution, supra note 111.

113.

U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55.

114.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 1966, at KAV 2306, 999

U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
115.

Id., 999 U.N.T.S. at 171.
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reports are discussed at the annual meetings of the Commission on Human
Rights which then reports to the General Assembly through the Economic
and Social Council.
The Commission on Human Rights also considers reports from
other United Nations agencies such as:
the International Labor
Organization, World Health Organization, and United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Since 1970, pursuant to
Resolution 1503 of the Economic and Social Council entitled, "Procedure
for Dealing with Communications Relating to Violations of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms,"", the Human Rights Commission has had the
mandate to investigate individual communications where they reveal a
consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights set out by the 1966
17
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
In the field of environmental protection, legal instruments can be
drafted in such a way that they do not only provide for states parties to
make regular reports on their implementation, but also give an institution,
such as the Conference of the Parties or the Secretariat, the right and duty
to establish inspection teams or to appoint special rapporteurs for the
purpose of actively monitoring and verifying the implementation of
international conventions. The instruments could also provide for the
participation of individuals and nongovernmental organizations in the
implementation, monitoring, and verification procedures. Furthermore,
similar to the provisions of the ILO Constitution, environmental law
instruments could require all parties thereto to specify the national
authority or authorities that have the competence and responsibility for
implementation when signing or ratifying. A time limit could also be
specified within which state parties must ratify and implement the
convention. Provisions could be included in environmental treaties which
oblige states to make annual reports to the Executive Director of UNEP on
the status of treaty implementations.
These reports could then be
summarized by the Executive Director and discussed by the Governing
Council during its regular sessions.
The 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe [Helsinki Final Act]"8 provides another example of
a practically successful nonbinding process that has led to very close
116. E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Escor, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 1A at 8, P1, U.N. Doc.
E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
117.

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1996,

KAV 2308, 993 U.N.T.S. at 3.
118. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 1292.
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interstate involvement in multilateral human rights protection in Europe.
Part VII of the Helsinki Final Act affords the state parties an unrivaled
opportunity to monitor the human rights performance of all the European
states. The commitment to human rights under Helsinky the Final Act is
of a political rather than a legal nature. Since 1975, a series of agreements
concerning human rights has been made within this process containing
procedures for monitoring compliance with human rights provisions which
include: exchanges of information on request, bilateral meetings, and
regular human rights conferences.
In the field of environmental
protection, a process such as the Helsinki Final Act could have been
established under the Rio Declaration"' by providing for joint and separate
state endeavors not only for protecting the environment, but also for
fulfilling their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and
agreements by which they may be bound to in this field. Such a provision
would give the state parties to a nonbinding international agreement the
right to monitor the implementation of environmental treaties and raise the
issue of implementation for discussion at relevant international
conventions.
The above mentioned innovative procedures and processes
would
go a long way towards ensuring adequate and effective implementation of
international legal instruments for the protection of the environment. In
addition, legislative institutional amendments, along with institutional
reorganizations, may be required.
If such amendments and
reorganizations facilitate the effective implementation of international
environmental treaties, they should be supported.
IV.

LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

A. Introduction
The international legal order has ascribed responsibility to the
states for any actions within their territorial jurisdictions or limits that
cause harm to other states or the interests of the international community
as a whole. This responsibility is recognized as the necessary corollary of
a state's sovereignty and territorial integrity:
"[AIll rights of an
international character involve international responsibility.
This
responsibility entails a duty to make reparation if an obligation is not
satisfied. . . . "
State responsibility is invoked in any case where the state violates
an international obligation.
The obligation can be recognized under
119. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 27.
120. Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (Spain v. U.K.), 2 R.I.A.A. 615, 641 (1923).
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customary international law or assumed under a treaty. The violation of
the obligation must be due to conduct attributable to the state, its organs,
or its agencies. In terms of both substantive and procedural rules,
ascription of liability in classic cases, such as injury to non-nationals or
nationalization of their properties, poses no particular difficulties under the
principles of international law. Liability for environmental damage or
injury causes particular problems that need to be addressed. The problems
are complex in cases of damage to areas of the environment which are
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction such as the high seas and outer
space, where damage to the environment may be due to the cumulative
effect of diverse sources. An example of complex cases is the greenhouse
effect which results from the cumulative effect of ozone depletion, global
air pollution, acid rain, deforestation, and land use patterns.
B. Liabilityfor Environmental Damage
In cases of environmental damage that result from the cumulative
effect of various harmful actions engaged in by several states, it is not easy
to assign responsibility in order to seek any compensation or remedial
action. Common causes of the greenhouse effect are exploitative patterns
that have led to unqualified economic growth, large-scale consumption and
industrial pollution, carbon dioxide accumulation, poverty, and population
growth. These patterns of causes have, consequently, laid stress on life
support systems resulting in deforestation and the depletion of other natural
No individual state can assume responsibility for the
resources.
environmental damage which results from the actions of many states.
Fortunately, however, the international community recognizes that
environmental damage such as the depletion of the stratospheric ozone
layer, global climate change, as well as depletion of biological species is a
These concerns call for concerted
common concern of humankind.
sharing of burdens caused by
the
equitable
international actions for
environmental protection, rather than assigning responsibility and liability
to individual states. 2, All states must cooperate in addressing these matters
because they are equally important to all nations. The concept of common
concern is intended to cover situations that fall outside the traditional
categorization of state responsibility as a bilateral relationship between the22
state in breach of an international obligation and the state that is injured.
121. Cf. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind,
G.A. Res. 53, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49 at 133, U.N. Doc. A/Res./43/53 (1988);
U.N. Doc. AIRes./44/207 (1989); U.N. Doc. A/Res./45/212 (1990).

122. See A. Cancado Trinidade & D.J. Attard, Report on the Proceedings of the Meeting,
in UNEP, THE MEETING OF THE GROUP OF LEGAL EXPERTS TO EXAMINE THE CONCEPTS OF
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The concept covers situations of multiple state responsibility such as those
in which states engage in concerted conduct or those in which states
engage in independent actions, whether in breach of an international
obligation or not, that cause damage to the environment.123
The international legal order has not yet devised rules addressing
situations involving multiple-causes and multiple-state damage to the
In particular, rules of compensation have not been
environment.
a
concrete
and identifiable level. The development of the
developed to
rules of compensation are made more complex by the fact that these cases
do not lend themselves to an easy determination of whether or not the
responsibility for the damage to the environment is common or joint. How
much is each individual state responsible for, and how much should its
contribution towards compensation be? Another complex issue involves
the determination of which state would initiate an action for compensation
given that all states would be victims of, for example, ozone depletion or
global climate change? Establishing a casual link between state conduct
and the resultant environmental damage, which is a condition precedent to
the initiation of an action for compensation, is not easy in the absence of a
clear regime of rules in such situations. An international rule of several or
joint state liability, in cases of multiple-cause and multiple-state damage to
the environment, is not feasible.
The complexity of the issues involved in liability and compensation
for environmental damage are further compounded by the fact that
damage, a key concept in international environmental law, has not lent
itself to an authoritative general definition. It is not every kind of
transboundary environmental injury that falls within the scope of this
The imprecision of this concept is largely due to the
concept.
interpretation given by many legal scholars to the obiter dictum of the
arbitral tribunal in the Trail Smelter Arbitration of 1941 between Canada
and the United States.124 The arbitral tribunal's conclusion is that under the
principles of international law, as well as of the law of the United States,
no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another state,
or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.12 This conclusion has been interprieted to mean, in the absence
THE COMMON CONCERN OF MANKIND IN RELATION TO GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

(David J. Attard ed., 1991).
123.

Id.

124. Trail Smelter Arbitration (Can. V. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941).

125. Id. at 1965.

19951

Situma

of serious consequences and the establishment of injury by clear and
convincing evidence, no liability can flow from state conduct damaging to
the environment. In other words, in the absence of substantial, legally
provable damage to the environment, state responsibility does not arise.
Therefore, there is no state responsibility for cumulative, synergistic, and
indirect damage that arises out of state conduct. What the law apparently
protects is property rights without regard to the environment, for these are
Damage to the environment does
the rights which are legally provable.
126
liability.
any
to
not seem to give rise
Since no state can exercise any jurisdiction over, or claim any
rights to the international commons, it follows that they are the least
protected under international law. Even if each state is under an obligation
to take action to prevent damage to the environment of the commons, the
consequence of the breach of such obligation is not clear under
international law. Both customary and conventional law is not clear on the
issue of the procedural right of any one state to invoke the liability of
another state for damage to the environment of the commons and to seek
compensation therefor. Obligations for the protection of the commons
may, admittedly, be obligations erga omnes, but the absence of an actio
popularis in international law that is, the right of any member of the
international community to take legal action for vindication of a public
interest, effectively bars an invocation by any one state of the
responsibility of another for breach of the obligation to prevent damage to
the environment of areas beyond the limits of its national jurisdiction and,
when damage has occurred, to demand compensation. The reasoning and
decisions of the International Court of Justice in the South West Africa
(Second Phase) Case,'1' the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co. Ltd.
Case,'1 and the Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia and New Zealand vs.
France) 29 suggest that, in the absence of any bilateral aspect, no state can
invoke the responsibility and liability of another for breach of a customary
or treaty law obligation for the preservation of the environment of the
commons. There is no evidence to suggest that the court's jurisprudence
shows a progressive move towards the admission of an actio popularis to
enable an individual state(s) to vindicate an international obligation.
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C. Treaty and "Soft Law" Provisions on Liability and Compensation
for EnvironmentalDamage
As previously mentioned, liability has long been recognized as an
essential corollary of state sovereignty. Moreover, liability is a vital
concept in cases of transboundary environmental damage. Although the
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment recognized its
importance, the participating governments were unable to reach agreement
on a general and acceptable formulation of the concept. Participants at the
conference focused on ways "to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or
control of such states to areas beyond their jurisdiction."1 0 Since then, the
governments have been cautiously reluctant to cement multilateral
agreements prescribing principles of liability and compensation for
environmental damage caused by certain activities. State practice and
international adjudication remains obscure, and in its occurrence rare.
Consequently, if international claims for environmental damage were to be
made, it is fairly certain that the legal principles to be applied would be
those derived from either the municipal law, which is common to several
countries, or the Trail Smelter Arbitration, which still remains the
landmark decision.
Activities in outer space entail the rare area where the subject of
liability and compensation have been addressed in clear and concise terms.
Specifically, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Objects Launched into Outer Space' 3' provides that a launching
state shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by
its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight. 3
Articles IV and V provide for several and joint liability in cases of joint
launching of space objects by two or more states. States which suffer
damages or whose natural or juridical persons suffer damage may present
compensation claims for damages to the launching state(s) through
diplomatic channels.' The compensation for which the launching state is
liable is to be determined in accordance with international law and the
principles of justice and equity. Upon determination of liability, reparation
will be provided in order to restore the person, natural or juridical, the
130.
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131. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Outer Space Objects,
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state, or the international organization to the condition which would have
Where the claim for
existed if the damage had not occurred.' 34
compensation is not settled within a year from the date on which the
claimant state(s) notified the launching state(s) of the submission of the
documentation of the claim, the parties concerned are required to establish
a Claims Commission at the request of any party.'35
From the standpoint of protecting the environment, it should be
noted that the provisions for liability and compensation are clearly
circumscribed by the definition of the term "damage" under the
Convention: loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health,
loss of or damage to property of states or of persons natural or juridical,
and property of international intergovernmental organizations. 6 The
Convention seeks to provide protection and compensation for loss or
impairment of personal and property rights in the use of the environment.
Such protection and compensation extend to legally recognized and
enforceable interests in which the victims can be clearly identified under
the municipal and international legal regimes. It is apparent from the
provisions of the Convention on Damage Caused by Outer Space Objects
that liability and compensation for environmental damage is both obscure
and not feasible. This is evidenced by the provision that claims for
compensation for damage suffered cannot be presented more than one year
after the date of the occurrence of the damage, or the identification of the
launching state which is liable, or not more than one year following the
date on which the claimant state learned of the occurrence of the damage
and identified the launching state which is liable.'3- The provision is
obscure because protection of the environment is incidental only to
protection of personal and property rights. It is not feasible because
environmental damage may take much longer than the specified time limits
specified to manifest itself. The Minamata Bay mercury poisoning in
Japan and the Love Canal toxic dumping in the state of New York are
examples that readily come to mind. In both cases, it took more than
twenty years for a manifestation of the damage and for the causal linkages
to be established.
Some conventions that provide for liability and compensation do so
in respect to the private operator while others provide that the operator's
state is liable on a subsidiary basis if the operator or his insurance cannot
134.
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pay. For example, the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy'38 imposes liability on the operator of a nuclear
installation for damage to or loss of life of any person and damage to or
loss of any property save those that are expressly excluded.'3 9 This
convention also provides that compensation for damage may be claimed
from the operator, insurer, or other financial guarantor.' 4 The 1963
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage' 4 imposes
absolute liability on the operator for any nuclear damage. Damage is
defined to mean loss of life and personal injury, or damage to property or
such other loss or damage as may be provided for by the law of the
14 2
competent court or the installation state.
Even in cases of what may be termed as true environmental
conventions, the establishment of liability and compensation regimes for
environmental damage has not been overly appreciated by states. Neither
the 1979 European Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, 4 3 nor any of the protocols thereunder, have any liability and
compensation provisions. Liability and compensation provisions are also
lacking in the Vienna Convention on the Ozone Layer'" and the Montreal
Protocol on the Ozone Layer.-'4 The Basel Convention'46 provides for the
parties' co-operation with a view to adopting a protocol which sets out
appropriate rules and procedures in the field of liability and compensation
for damage resulting from the transboundary movement and disposal of
hazardous and other wastes.'"4 At the First Meeting of the Conference of
the Parties held in Piriapolis, Uruguay, in December 1992, they decided to
establish an ad hoc working group of legal and technical experts to
consider and develop a draft protocol on liability and compensation. Also
to be considered in the draft was the establishment of an international fund
for the compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary
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movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal. The first session of the
working group was held mid-September 1993 at Geneva. There is still a
lot of work to be done towards the proposed international fund. Unsettled
issues include the structure and purposes of the fund, limits of the fund's
obligation to pay compensation, the contributions to the fund, and the
criteria for the assessment of such contributions and how they will be
collected. Also to be resolved are the issues pertaining to the institution(s)
with the power to assess the injury suffered and the commensurate
compensation as well as the beneficiaries thereof. More importantly,
questions such as the applicable law, the locus standi of the injured parties,
and the jurisdiction of domestic courts for purposes of filing a claim for
compensation will need to be addressed and agreed upon by the parties.
Ideally, the envisaged fund's purpose would be to ensure that
adequate resources are available to provide full and adequate compensation
for damage or loss caused by the transboundary movements of hazardous
and other wastes and their disposal to the extent that the compensation
payable under the liability provisions of the proposed protocol is
inadequate or not available for one reason or another. In other words, the
fund would provide both a supplementary and alternative cover in cases
where the person liable cannot provide any or full compensation. So far
the parties have not addressed the issue of liability and compensation for
damage or injury to the environment qua environment, that is, the global
commons over which no claim of any rights or jurisdiction can be had.
Coincidentally, neither the Biological Diversity Convention'4 8 nor the
Climate Change Convention"9 has any provisions on liability and
compensation for environmental damage.
At the regional level, the Council of Europe adopted the
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
Article 12 of the
Dangerous to the Environment in June 1993.'-0
Convention provides:
Each Party shall ensure that where appropriate, taking due
account of the risks of the activity, operators conducting a
dangerous activity on its territory be required to participate
in a financial security scheme or to have and maintain a
financial guarantee up to a certain limit, of such type and
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terms as specified by internal law, to cover the liability
under this Convention. 151
The financial guarantees to be established under the municipal laws of the
member states of the Council of Europe and other states which are
signatories to the Convention will be insurance fundsto be drawn upon for
compensation in cases of: loss of life or personal injury, loss of or damage
to property, and loss or damage by impairment of the environment. The
costs of reinstatement and or restoration or the costs of preventive
measures to be undertaken or actually undertaken as a result of the
dangerous activity may also be drawn from the fund. Member states will
be obligated to enact new or amend existing legislation in order to make a
provision for such insurance funds to compensate for environmental
damage. Central to the Convention is the emphasis on risk management in
the handling, storage, production, or discharge of dangerous substances.
Additionally, risk management shall pertain to management of substances
or preparations which have properties which constitute a significant risk
for man, the environment, property, or substances specified in Annex 1
15 2
Part B of the Convention.
The International Maritime Organization,
formerly the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, has addressed the
issues of liability and compensation for damage to the marine environment
in several conventions adopted under its auspices. For example, under the
1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage,15 3 the owner of a ship was liable for any pollution damage caused
in the territory including the territorial sea of another state unless the
owner proved that the damage either resulted from an act of war,
hostilities, insurrection, a natural phenomenon of an exceptional,
inevitable, and irresistible character, wholly caused by an act or omission
done with intent to cause damage by a third party, or the damage was
wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.-1 The owner's liability
under this Convention was limited to an aggregate amount of 210 million
francs. "I
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The parties to the 1969 Convention adopted the International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage'16 in 1971 in order to ensure that
adequate compensation was available to persons who suffered damage
caused by pollution resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from
ships. The Fund Convention was adopted because the compensation
regime, provided under the 1969 Liability Convention, did not afford full
compensation for victims of oil pollution damage in all cases. The Fund
Convention imposes an additional financial burden on ship owners. 7 It
provides for compensation and indemnification and raises the aggregate
amount of compensation payable to 40 billion francs subject to increases
by a decision of the Assembly of the Fund.' 8 Articles 10-15 inclusively
provide for the mode of contributions to the Fund by each contracting
state; the assessment of annual contributions is based on the amount of oil
tonnage carried by sea from each contracting state." 9
The liability and compensation under the Liability Convention was
limited to areas within the national jurisdiction of a state in which property
rights have been prejudiced as a result of the oil pollution. The other areas
such as the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, the high sea,
and the sea bed were not covered. However, possibly influenced by the
legal developments in this area and, in particular, the adoption of the 1982
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea; ' ° the IMO amended both the
Liability Convention and the Fund Convention in order to enlarge their
scopes by the adoption of protocols in 1984. For instance, under the 1984
Protocol to the Liability Convention,' 6 ' "pollution damage" is defined to
mean:
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil
from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may
occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the
environment other than loss of profit from such
impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable
measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be
156. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, KAV 2338, 1110 U.N.T.S. at 57,
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. at 284.
157. Id. art. 2, 1110 U.N.T.S. at 60, 11 I.L.M. at 285.
158. Id. arts. 4-9, 1110 U.N.T.S. at 61-65, 11 I.L.M. at 286-90.
159. Id. art. 10-15, 1110 U.N.T.S. at 65-68, 11 I.L.M. at 290-93.
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undertaken; (b) the costs of preventive measures and
further loss or damage caused by preventive measures. '62
The 1984 Convention is applicable exclusively to:
(a) . . . pollution damage caused (i) in the territory,
including the territorial sea, of a Contracting state, and (ii)
in the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting state,
established in accordance with international law, or if a
Contracting state has not established such a zone, in an
area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of that state
determined by that state in accordance with international
law and extending not more than 200 nautical miles from
the baseline from which the breadth of its territorial sea is
measured; (b) . . . preventive measures, whenever taken to
3
prevent or minimize such damage. 6
Liability is limited to an aggregate amount of 50.7 million SDRs subject to
the right of subrogation.1 6 Liability and compensation therefore are
expanded accordingly.
Similarly, the 1984 Protocol to the Fund Convention '65 provides
compensation for pollution to the extent that the protection afforded by the
1984 Liability Convention is inadequate.
It applies to the same
geographical area as the Liability Convention and raises the maximum
compensation to 200 million SDR's.'" Liability and compensation for
damage to the high seas and other sectors of the marine environment are
included in the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. 67 Article
192 of the Convention states the general obligation for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment.'6 Article 235 provides, inter alia,
that states shall ensure the fulfillment of their international obligations
concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment. 69
Article 235 further ensures that recourse is available in accordance with a
states' legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other relief
162.
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in respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine environment." °
States are under an obligation to cooperate in the further development of
international law relating to responsibility and -liability for the assessment
of and compensation for damage as well as development of criteria and
procedures for payment of adequate compensation funds."' To date, the
establishment of a mechanism for liability and compensation has not
materialized.
An effective liability and compensation structure has not
progressed beyond recommendations, resolutions, and declarations adopted
by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. The work of
the International Law Commission and its draft articles on "International
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law" 2 has been the most sustained effort in the
establishment of a liability and compensation regime at the international
level.
Under the draft articles, a state of origin is liable to fully
compensate an affected state for harm or damage caused by the physical
consequences of activities that are internationally lawful. Reparation
would be decided by negotiations between the states, and the states are to
7
be guided by criteria of an equitable character in determining the same.' '
Principle 12 of the 1978 United Nations Environment Program
Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of Environment for the Guidance
of states in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural
Resources Shared by Two or More states , 74 reiterates the principle of
international responsibility for environmental damage. Principle 12
provides that states should cooperate to develop further international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of environmental
damage arising out of the utilization of a shared natural resource and
damage to areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Principle 13 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development"5 addresses the issue of liability and compensation at the
national and international levels. At the national level, the principle
obligates states to develop their national laws regarding liability and
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage.
170. Id., 21 I.L.M. at 1315.
171.
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At the international level, states are obligated to cooperate in an
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international
law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of
environmental damage which are caused by activities within their
jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction. States, however,
have been reluctant to move fast.
The bottom line of these principles, recommendations, and
declarations regarding liability and compensation has been the
identifiability of the source state and the damage suffered. The remedy of
legal liability and compensation is feasible where the damage is
identifiable, traceable to a state of origin, and reasonably foreseeable by
16
that state.
V. CONCLUSION
As the United Nations Environment Programme sets to implement
the relevant provisions of Agenda 21, the Montevideo Programme II needs
to account for the efficacy of the treaties adopted under its aegis. The
UNEP should also analyze how the trend for the 1990's should be taken
into account. In particular, UNEP needs to move from the adoption of
framework conventions whose provisions are no more than political
statements, and get to the stage of adopting more comprehensive
provisions following some of the precedents referred to above. Special
attention needs to be given to the legal empowerment of victims of
environmental damage or loss by granting them locus standi to espouse
their claims in the courts of the state where the source of the damage or
loss is suffered. The 1974 Nordic Environmental Protection Convention
provides a useful precedent.'" Under the Convention, any person who is
or may be affected by a nuisance caused by environmentally harmful
activities in another contracting state has the right to bring before the
appropriate Court or Administrative Authority of that state the questions
of: the permissibility of such activities, the measures to prevent damage,
and the measures to appeal against the decision of such court or authority
to the same extent and on the same terms as a legal entity of the state in
which the activities are being carried out.'7
This right extends to
proceedings for the compensation of environmental damages.
Compensation should not to be judged by rules which are less favorable to
176. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 29. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. AIb.),
1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).

177. Convention on the Protection of the Environment Between Denmark, Finland,
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the injured party than the rules of compensation of the state in which the
activities are being carried out.7 9 The right established in this article is, in
principle, to be regarded as including the right to demand the purchase of
the claimant's real,property. 11
Since no state can claim jurisdiction over any sovereign or
property rights in the global commons, they are currently the least
protected areas under international environmental law. An effective legal
and policy mechanism for their protection is needed. A contingency fund
needs to be considered. All nations could make contributions to the fund
on the basis of their annual United Nations budgetary assessments. The
fund would essentially be a trust fund to be resorted to in the event of any
potential or actual damage to the environment of the commons. The
money would be used to take preventive measures or undertake the
reparation and restoration operations.
It should be noted, however, that whether such fund is established
at the municipal, regional, or international level, its success will depend on
several factors. The most important factor is a highly effective institutional
system of transparency and the monitoring of actors, whether they are
natural or juridical persons. International law has yet to establish such a
system because governments have been reluctant to surrender their
sovereignty to an international authority with power to control their
conduct.' 8 ' However, if the common concern of humankind is to be
effectively addressed, the veil of sovereignty may have to be pierced for
the protection of the environment and the welfare of all. This is the task
that the United Nations Environment Programme faces in implementing
the Montevideo Programme II.
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